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COMMERCIAL LAW
FREDERICK M. HART

the past year only one case directly involving commercial
DURING
law reached the Court of Appeals. The major activity in this field
took place in the lower courts and in the legislature. Principal developments include numerous statutes amending the State Banking
Law, legislation and cases affecting a non-banking corporation's power
to discount notes, judicial interpretation of the nature of a bank
draft, and several cases examining warranty actions in the sale of
foodstuffs.
I
LEGISLATION

The last general revision of the New York Banking Law was
completed in 1914.1 The phenomenal growth of the industry during
the intervening forty-four years has been accompanied by marked
changes in the banking structure. Bank mergers, branch banking,
chain banking and, more recently, a move toward the holding company
form are the most spectacular symbols of this metamorphosis. Of equal
importance is the growth of savings banks, of savings and loan associations, and of the influence which insurance companies have exerted
through their investments. In 1955 the Joint Legislative Committee
to Review the Banking Law was established by the legislature.2 Emanating from this committee's work are some sixty-seven bills passed
during the year. The more important of these are noted below.3
Unfortunately, one of the most serious questions before the committee was left unanswered when attempts to formulate a policy on
bank holding companies were unsuccessful.4 Efforts to alter boundaries of the banking districts so as to enlarge the New York City
District to include Westchester also failed. 5
Bank and Trust Companies.-The organization of bank and trust
companies was affected by legislation which increased the required
amount of capital for their establishment,0 required at least seven,
instead of five, directors for institutions having a capital stock in excess
Frederick M. Hart is Assistant Professor at New York University Law School and a
member of the District of Columbia and New York bars.
1 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1914, ch. 369.
2 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 307, at 871.
3 For a comprehensive summary of all laws enacted during the survey period affecting banking, see N.Y. State Banking Dep't, Legislative Summary (1958).
4 Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Revise the Banking Law, Leg. Doc.
No. 18, at 12 (1958).
5 s. Int. 2542 (1958).
6 N.Y. Banking Law § 90(3) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch.
754.
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of two million dollars,7 and provided that not more than one-third of
the directors be active officers or employees.8
Legislation modifying their business activities includes measures:
( 1) allowing the purchase, as well as the discounting, of certain negotiable instruments and evidences of debt; 0 (2) permitting the exercise
through foreign branches of whatever powers as are usual in the place
where the foreign branch is located; 10 (3) repealing a former prohibition forbidding the purchase of a bank or trust company's own
obligations at less than face value; 11 ( 4) authorizing loans to bank
officers and employees; 12 (5) restricting investments in bank premises;13 (6) limiting the holding as security of another bank's stock to
no more than twenty-five per cent of the total capital stock of the
debtor bank; 14 and (7) revising lending limitations.111
Savings Banks.-Probably the most significant change involving
savings banks enables them to lend funds secured by a first lien mortgage upon real estate to the amount of twenty-five thousand dollars,
or to ninety per cent of the appraised valuation of the property, whichever is less. The property must be in New York State, within fifty
miles of the bank's principal office, and improved by a one-family
residence.16 Investments by savings banks were also authorized in
slum clearance projects,17 and authorizations for FHA and VA bonds
and mortgages,18 leaseholds,19 bankers acceptances and bills of exchanges,20 and promissory notes were extended.21
7

N.Y. Banking Law§ 116(1) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch.

8
9

N.Y. Banking Law§ 116(6) (Supp. 1958), added by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 430.
N.Y. Banking Law § 96(1) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch.

430.
780.

10 N.Y. Banking Law§ 96(10)

(Supp. 1958), added by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 79.
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 236 [Repealing N.Y. Banking Law § 103(5) (1950)].
12 N.Y. Banking Law,§ 103(8) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch.
827. This chapter also repealed N.Y. Banking.Law § 130(3) (1950).
13 N.Y. Banking Law§ 98(1), (2) (Supp.-1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958,
ch. 62.
14 N.Y. Banking Law§ 103(2) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch.
98.
15 N.Y. Banking Law§ 103(1) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch.
374.
16 N.Y. Banking Law§ 235(6) (b-1) (Supp. 1958), added by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958,
ch. 949.
17 N.Y. Banking Law § 235(28) (Supp. 1958), added by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch.
564.
18 N.Y. Banking Law § 235(20) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958,
ch. 795.
19 N.Y. Banking Law § 235(6) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958,
ch. 908.
20 N.Y. Banking Law § 235(1Z) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958,
ch. 586.
21 N.Y. Banking Law § 235(8) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958,
ch. 695.
11
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Savings and Loan Associations.-Abandonment of the rotation
system of withdrawals in favor of an arrangement expected to serve
as a model for other states22 is the most important change in the
regulation of savings and loan associations. Previously, an association
could limit withdrawals to one thousand dollars, and require a member wishing more to file a new request which would not be honored
until previous applications, up to one thousand dollars, were paid.23
Under the new system an association may demand a notice of sixty
days before paying withdrawals. If such notice is made mandatory,
then no payments may be made on any request until sixty days have
passed.24 At the end of sixty days the withdrawal application must be
paid in full or the Superintendent of Banking is authorized to take
possession.25 To insure sufficient liquidity for the operation of this
system, investments in conventional mortgages are now limited to
eighty-five per cent, except where the Superintendent of Banking authorizes additional amounts.26 Mortgages insured by the FHA and VA,
as well as those made pursuant to Title I of the Bankhead-Jones Farm
Tenant Act,27 are not considered in computing the amount of investments for the purposes of these sections.
Saving and loan associations were also affected by acts which:
( 1) authorize the making of loans up to twenty-five thousand dollars
or ninety per cent of the appraised value of land improved by a single
family residence, whichever figure is lesser; 28 ( 2) allow them to service mortgages for others; 20 and (3) permit participation with other
banking institutions in the making of mortgage investments.80
Industrial Banks.-The legislation of the past year increased the
minimum number of directors for an industrial bank from five to
seven,31 and provided that no more than one-third of the directors
could be active as officers or employees. 32 In addition, the power
75 Banking L.J. 632 (1958).
,'"'-<
Ibid.
"
N.Y. Banking Law § 390(1), (2) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Scss. Laws
1958, ch. 880, §§ 2, 3.
25 N.Y. Banking Law§ 606(1) (f) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Scss. Laws 1958,
ch. 880, § 5.
26 N.Y. Banking Law § 380-d (Supp. 1958), added by N.Y. Scss. Laws 1958, ch.
880, § 1.
27 50 Stat. 522 (1937), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1000-25 (1952).
28 N.Y. Banking Law § 380(1)(a) (Supp. 1958), added by N.Y. Scss. Laws 1958,
ch. 948.
20 N.Y. Banking Law § 383(6) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Scss. Laws 19581
ch. 227.
30 N.Y. Banking Law § 380-c (Supp. 1958), added by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch.
362.
31 N.Y. Banking Law § 290(6) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Scss. Laws 1958,
ch. 553, § 1.
32 N.Y. Banking Law § 303 (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch.
22

23
24
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of an industrial bank to purchase and hold stock of the FDIC was
discontinued.33
Safe Deposit Business.-Laws which regulate the operation of
safe deposit business are now codified in article Vill-A of the
Banking Law.3 -i
Discounting of Notes by Non,.banking Corporations.-One of the
most significant legislative developments to the commercial community
is an act35 authorizing non-banking corporations to discount notes.
This practice, long followed by factoring and finance companies, had
been threatened by the Court of Appeals decision in Miller v. Discount
Factors, Inc., 36 which held that section 131 of the Banking Law prohibited discounting except by banking institutions. Although the
Miller case has been subsequently limited by allowing foreclosure of
a mortgage given as security for a discounted note,31 the present legislation was necessary to provide a means of recovering on unsecured
notes.
Installment Sales of A11tomobiles.-Six bills38 amending the recently adopted Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act30 were
passed during the year. Two of these relate to insurance issued in
connection with such sales requiring that the type of coverage be
described40 and that credit be given the purchaser for unearned premiums if the insurance is cancelled.41 Total credit charges for insurance
are now limited to seven dollars per hundred per annum regardless
of the age of the vehicle,42 and additional protection to the consumer
553, § 8. This provision does not effect present directors who are serving as officers or
employees, even though by doing so the one-third figure is e.,;ceeded.
33 N.Y. Banking Law§ 292(11) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch.
553, § 2.
34 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 879, § 17.
35 N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law§ 18 (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch.
991. The Banking Law was also amended to bring it into conformity with the General
Corporation Law. N.Y. Banking Law § 131~1) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1958, ch. 990.
36 1 N.Y.2d 275, 135 N.E.2d 33, 152 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1956). See Kupfer, Prohibited
Discounts Under the Banking and General Corporation Laws: The Impacts or Miller v.
Discount Factors, Inc., 12 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 30 (1957).
37 Amherst Factors, Inc. v. Kochenburger, 4 N.Y.2d 203, 149 N.E.2d 863, 173 N.Y.S.
2d 570 (1958). For a federal case which comes to the same result when a chattel mortgage
is involved, see New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Samuel Breiter & Co.,
253 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1958). These two cases are discussed at pp. 1150-51 infra.
38 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, chs. 681-86. See also McKinney's N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958,
at 1836.
39 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law art. 9 (Supp. 1958).
40 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 302(5) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958,
ch. 681.
41 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law§ 302(6) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958,
ch. 681.
42 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 303 (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958,
ch. 682.
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is provided by requiring that be be informed of bis rights when his
contract is assigned to a third party.43
Installment Sale of "Merchandise Certiftcates."-The installment
sale of merchandise certificates which are redeemable for goods and
services was sanctioned by an amendment to the Retail Installment
Sales Act.44 These are now considered as a form of retail installment
credit agreement for the purposes of regulation.4 r;
II
CASES

Discounting by Non-banking Corporations .-The legislative
overruling of Miller v. Discount Factors, Jnc.46 was accompanied by a
significant limitation of that decision by the courts. Although the
action of the legislature diminishes the importance of these holdings,
they cannot go unnoted in this year's Survey.
The Miller case, decided in 1956, held that no action could be
brought on unsecured notes which had been discounted by a nonbanking corporation. The decision was based upon the statutory prohibition against discounting, except by banking institutions, found in
section 131 of the Banking Law. Since the court considered only the
narrow issue of whether an action brought on the notes themselves
was maintainable, it did not foreclose a remedy for money had and
received to recoup the amount actually paid to the borrower. Such an
action had been allowed prior to the Miller case,47 and the court gave
no indication of any intention to reverse its previous rulings.
Foreclosure of a mortgage given as security for discounted notes
offered another possibility of relief. Prior to the Miller case the court
had held such mortgages enforceable even where the secured notes
were void.48 Subsequent to the Miller decision, however, the argument
was raised that discounting in contravention of section 131 rendered
not only the notes void, but also all mortgages given as security.
Lower courts uniformly refused to adopt this position, whether the
mortgage was of real property or of chattels.40
43

N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 302(9) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Scss. Laws 1958,

ch. 684.
44 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law art. 10 (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Scss. Laws 1958,
ch. 687.
4r; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 401(8) (Supp. 1958), as amended, N.Y. Scss. Laws 1958,
ch. 687.
46 1 N.Y.2d 275, 135 N.E.2d 33, 152 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1956).
47 Pratt v. Short, 79 N.Y. 437 (1880).
48 Williams-Dexter Co. v. Dowland Realty Corp., 259 N.Y. 581, 182 N.E. 189 (1932);
Pratt v. Eaton, 79 N.Y. 449 (1880).
40 Amherst Factors, Inc. v. Kochenburger, 4 App. Div. 2d 745, 164 N.Y.S.2d 815
(2d Dep't 1957), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 203, 149 N.E.2d 863, 173 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1958); Anti-
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In Amherst Factors, bu;. v. Koclzenburger,u 0 the Court of Appeals
was faced with the question of whether a mortgage on real estate,
given as security for a note discounted by a non-banking corporation,
was enforceable through a foreclosure action. In reaffirming the preMiller cases, the court held that the New York General Corporation
Law specifically authorized non-banking corporations to lend money
on notes secured by mortgages.51 Where the notes had been discounted, section 131 of the Banking Law affected the transaction by
voiding the notes but not the accompanying security. The same result
was reached by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in a case involving a chattel mortgage_r;:i
Thus, the Miller case, which had "staggered the financial and
commercial mechanism," 53 survived only two years. Criticised as failing to effectuate "the common understanding and reasonable ID.'J)ectations of laymen in the conduct of their daily affairs,"M its holding was
quickly limited by the courts. What remained was destroyed by the
legislature. It is unlikely that its demise will engender much grief among
either the legal or business communities. Although the Miller decision
was fully in accord with sound principles of statutory construction, its
holding resulted more as a hindrance to legitimate business practices
than to effectuate the purposes of the statute.
Bank Drafts.-The right of a drawer bank to raise the defense
that a successor in interest to the payee of a bank draft lacked good
title was affirmed by Intemational Firearms Co. v. Kingston Trust
Co.55 The purchaser of the draft, which was drawn by Kingston on
another local bank, sent the instrument to a stakeholder in Canada
with instructions that it should not be delivered to the payee until
certain goods cleared customs. This condition was never met, and the
purchaser demanded return of the draft. The stakeholder refused, and
payee's successor in interest obtained possession as a result of an in
rem action brought in Canada. Concurrently, the purchaser and the
drawer bank agreed to have payment stopped, and the purchase price
of the instrument was returned to the purchaser. Payee1s successor in
pyros Co. v. Samuel Breiter & Co., 165 N.Y.S.2d 976 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1957) ; County
Indus. Corp. v. Francia, 5 llrfisc. 2d 602, 164 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup. Ct., Westch. Co. 1957).
See also New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Samuel Breiter & Co., 253
F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1958).
50 4 N.Y.2d 203, 149 N.E.2d 863, 173 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1958).
51 N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 18 (Supp. 1958}.
52 New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Samuel Breiter & Co., 253
F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1958).
53 Kupfer, supra note 36, at 30.
54 Id. at 47. See also Kripke, Illegal ''Discounts" by Non-Banking Corporations in
New York, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 1183 (1956).
55 6 App. Div. 2d 171, 175 N.Y.S.2d 794 (3d Dep't 1958).
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interest brought this action against the drawer bank for payment of
the draft. Plaintiff's title was found to be defective by the trial court,
and judgment was rendered for the defendant. The appellate division
affirmed with two justices dissenting.
The majority and minority opinions differ on the right of the
purchaser and drawer bank to revoke their contract by mutual consent and to stop payment of a bank draft. The majority, in finding
a bank draft analogous to a personal check, held that where payment
was stopped, the drawer bank would not incur liability if the title of
the payee, or his successor in interest, was defective. Relying on
Kerr S.S. Co. v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China/' 0 the
dissenting justices considered the transfer of the draft to the purchaser in exchange for money an executed contract which may not be
revoked. The dissenters would hold the drawer absolutely liable on
the instrument where payment had been stopped.
The Kerr case, itself a minority view/'7 does hold that a purchaser may not unilaterally rescind his agreement with the drawer
bank even where he is in possession of the draft and it is impossible
for him to transmit it to the payee. It is clearly distinguishable from
the instant case, however, in which there is no disagreement between
the purchaser and the drawer bank, both agreeing to have payment
stopped. The holding of the Kerr case does not deal with the right of
a drawer bank to stop payment where there has been a mutual rescission of the agreement between it and the purchaser of the draft, nor
does it touch upon the defenses available to the drawer bank when this
results in suit on the instrument.
Whether payment can be stopped without casting absolute liability on the drawer depends upon the nature of a bank draft. It is
profitable to compare it with other instruments used to transmit
money, namely, personal checks, certified checks and cashiers' checks.
There is no doubt that payment can be stopped on a personal check,Gs
and this normally applies to a personal check certified at the request
of a drawer. 59 Where the check is certified at the request of the payee
or a holder, a contrary result is reached on the rationale that the
certification is in effect an acceptance by the drawee bank. 00 New
York has, by statute, denied the right to stop payment on all certified
checks. 61 It is generally stated that payment cannot be stopped on a
56
57

58

292 N.Y. 253, 54 N.E.2d 813 (1944).
See 57 Harv. L. Rev. 918 (1944).
Florence Mining Co. v. Brown, 124 U.S. 385 (1888); 7 Am. Jur. Banks § 602

(1937).
Britton, Bills and Notes 837 (1943); 7 Am. Jur. Banks § 603 (1937).
Carnegie Trust Co. v. First Nat'! Bank, 213 N.Y. 301, 107 N.E. 693 (1915).
N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 325-a (Supp. 1958). No similar provision is found
in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act.
59
60
61
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cashier's check..62 Holdings to this effect have either allowed the
payee or holder to treat the instrument as a promissory note03 since
the drawer and drawee are the same person, or have reasoned that the
check is accepted by the act of issuance.64
The logical reasons for imposing absolute liability upon the
drawer of a cashier's check and for refusing to allow a personal check
certified at the holder's request to be stopped are not applicable to
bank drafts. Although a bank draft is considered by some authorities
to be identical with a cashier's check,65 this fundamental difference
exists: only in the cashier's check are the drawer and drawee merged
in one person. As acceptance can be implied when a bank draws a
draft upon another bank, there is no satisfactory rationale for considering it to be an absolute promise to pay.
The implication of Justice Herlihy's dissent in the International
Firearms case that the majority's holding will leave the bank draft
with little more significance than a personal check does not appear to
be realistic. The essential difference between the two is that the bank
draft is based upon the credit of the drawer bank, while a personal
check relies upon the credit of an individual. The majority opinion
does not refute this distinction. All that it says is that whoever demands payment must show good title. This position is in agreement
with the majority of jurisdictions considering the question,co and is
sound.
Warranty of Wholesomeness: Privity.-Antagonists of the requirement that a plaintiff must establish privity of contract with the
defendant in order to maintain a cause of action in warranty should
rally round the flag post and raise a banner to salute Justice George
Starke. His opinion in Conklin v. Hotel Waldorf Astoria Corp.01 revived the "assault on the citadel of privity'' in New York. He followed this with an article68 criticising the privity principle in which he
characterized it as "just a 'bugaboo.' " 69 Finally, in June of this year,
62 Annots., 56 AL.R. 532 (1928), 107 AL.R. 1463 (1937). But note contrary c:ru:6
discussed therein.
63 Cable & Wireless, Ltd. v. Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., 191 Misc. 567, 79 N.Y.S.Zd
597 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1948), aff'd sub nom. Cable & Wireless, Ltd. v. Lyon, 304 N.Y.
574, 107 N.E.Zd 75 (1952) (mem.).
64 Matter of Bank of United States, 243 App. Div. 287, 277 N.Y. Supp. 96 (1st Dcp't
1935).
65 10 C.J .S. Bills and Notes § 5 (1938). Sec Kohler v. First Nat'l Bank, 157 Wash.
417, 289 Pac. 47 (1930).
66 Annot., 107 AL.R. 1463, 1465 (1937). Sec also Hurley v. Union Trust Co. 244
App. Div. 590, 280 N.Y. Supp. 474 (3d Dep't 1935).
61 5 Misc. 2d 496, 161 N.Y.S.Zd 205 (N.Y. City Ct., N.Y. Co. 1957).
68 Starke, Implied Warranties of Quality and Wholesomeness in the Sale of Food,
137 N.YL.J. Nos. 67-69, p. 4, col. 1 (1957).
69 Id. at No. 67, p. 4, col. 2.
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when another action for breach of warranty came before him, he
found the law so totally confused that it required a thirty-four page
opinion to explain adequately his reasons for deciding a city court
case.70 In the course of this opinion, which reads more like an appellate brief, the learned Justice invites the higher courts to "clarify
the legal atmosphere clouding the subject." 71 Although he is quick to
note the handful of opinions which have relied upon his reasoning in
the Conklin case and his subsequent article, he cautiously refrains
from pointing out that whatever clouds hang over the problem are a
result of his own efforts.
The importance of the recent decisions involving the privity question, only one of which reached an appellate court, lies principally in
the possibility that they will lead to a re-examination of the problem
by the Court of Appeals. So far, New York has refused to follow the
nation-wide trend away from the privity requirement, 72 and a renouncement in this jurisdiction of the established maxim "no privityno warranty" would be significant. The purpose of this survey would
be perverted by a full discussion of the numerous questions which must
be answered if the broad criticisms leveled by the lower courts are
accepted, but some note of the year's cases is justified.
The facts of the Conklin case, noted in last year's Survey, 78 were
ideal for the purpose of attacking the privity concept. Two women
were served lunch in one of defendant's dining rooms. One was injured by the food; the other paid the bill. A holding that the injured
party lacked a cause of action in warranty simply because payment by
her companion left her with no contractual relationship with the defendant would appear wholly unjust. However, it was possible to
allow recovery in warranty without departing from the established
privity rules. The court held that the contract between restaurateur
and patron commenced at the time the order was placed and accepted,
and that as soon as this contractual relationship existed, a warranty
ran to the defendant that the food was wholesome. Although this was
apparently -the rationale of the decision, the court also pointed out the
possibility of finding an agency relationship between the patrons, or of
construing the contract between the paying party and the defendant
as a third party beneficiary contract. As resting upon the holding
that a contractual relationship did in fact exist, the decision is wholly
in harmony with prior New York law.
The article by Justice Starke which followed had a far wider
10 Parish v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 177 N.Y.S.Zd 7 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct., Mnnhattan 1958).
71 Id. at 11.
72 Cf. Prosser, Torts 507 (Zd ed.1955).
78 1957 Survey of N.Y. Law, 32 N.Y.UL. Rev. 1405.
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scope, advocating complete abandonment of the privity requirement.
Less than two months after its publication, a judge sitting in the Municipal Court of the City of New York allowed recovery against a
manufacturer of a chocolate bar although the plaintiff had purchased
the candy from a local retailer.74 The report of the case leaves some
doubt as to the rationale of the decision. It states:
The Judge charged the contract was between the manufacturer and
the jobber, and then by the jobber and the retailer; and such contracts
were made knowingly for the benefit of the public.
Reliance has been placed on the manufacturer of the sealed product
rather than on the jobber or retailer. The manufacturer in placing sealed
products upon the market, especially by bis advertising and printed labels
has intentionally brought himself into direct relationship with the ultimate purchaser or consumer. The Judge charged that there was an
implied warranty of quality and wholesomeness that went along with the
peanut bar from the manufacturer to the ultimate consumer.7G

Six months later special term decided the case of W elclt v.
Schiebelhuth.16 Mrs. Welch had purchased a cake from the defendantretailer. Suit was instituted by her husband and two guests who allegedly became ill after having ingested the cake. Plaintiffs' motion to amend
their complaint to allege for each of them an additional cause of action for breach of warranty was opposed on the grounds that no privity
existed. The court briefly reviewed legislation and judicial decisions in
other states which have overturned the privity principle. It then indulged in the novelty of citing legislation, recommended in New York
but never adopted, which would extend the liability of a vendor to the
buyer's employees and to members of his household. Although it
would seem that failure of a recommended bill would indicate, if anything, that it did not represent the desires of the legislators, the court
here considered the discarded bill as an indication that it was what
the legislature advocated. Going on to cite cases in which privity had
been held to exist on an agency relationship, the court notes that New
York "has chipped away, eroded and streamlined the privity rule and
its demise, without elegy, is in view."~ 7 Concluding that it "is . . .
evident as long as we are incumbered with the privity rule, no matter
how it may be disguised, progress towards the full protection of the
consumer will be slow and tedious,ms the court granted plaintiffs'
motion.
74 Lardaro v. I\IBS Cigar Corp., 10 Misc. 2d 873, 177 N.Y.S.2d 6 (N.Y.C. Munic.
Ct., Queens 1957).
75 Id. at 873-74, 177 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
76 11 Misc. 2d 312, 169 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1957).
77 Id. at 316, 169 N.Y .S.2d at 313.
78 Ibid.
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Two cases79 followed which considered the privity question in
connection with a husband's action for loss of consortium. In both of
these a wife recovered for breach of warranty, but the husband's action for medical expenses and loss of services was defeated because he
failed to establish that he was in privity with the defendant. The
possibility that the wife acted as his agent in making the purchase was
considered by one court,80 implying that the existence of an agency
relationship would be sufficient to hurdle the privity obstacle. It was
found, however, that the evidence failed to establish that he was the
principal in the sale.
In Parish v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,81 the last of this year's
reported cases involving privity decided by trial courts, plaintiff purchased a sealed jar of jam from a retailer. She and her infant children
were injured after having consumed it, and she brought suit on her
own behalf and as guardian ad !item of her two children. Defendant's
motion to dismiss the cause of action in warranty as to the two infants
on the ground that no privity of contract existed between them and the
defendant was denied by the court. The court could have justified its
decision either by construing the contract between the purchaser and
the defendant as a third party beneficiary contract for the benefit of
the infants, or by holding the purchaser to be the agent of her children.
Admittedly, both of these theories involve rationalizations not wholly
acceptable to the legal purist, but they do have the advantage of
being supported, at least in part, by prior New York cases. Justice
Starke chose instead to hold that "the archaic notion that privity
is an essential to recovery in a breach of warranty action is cardinal
error. It requires the acceptance of the artificial and the shutting of
our eyes to the realities of life."82 Thus, he tells us that the Court of
Appeals has been wrong in requiring privity of contract in warranty
cases, and supports his refusal to follow their erroneous decisions by
a strong and lengthy argument attacking privity from every corner.
The opinion is commendable for its forthright approach. Clearly
stating that the privity requirement should be totally abandoned, it
avoids the confusion which often results where the principle has been
retained, but twisted and distorted to fit "hard" cases. However, it is
79 Zampino v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 10 Misc. 2d 686, 173 N.Y.S.2d 117. (Sup. Ct.,
Montgomery Co. 1958); Lore v. De Simone Bros., 172 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct., Richmond Co. 1958).
80 Zampino v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra note 79, at 690, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
Prior to these cases the city court, Bronx County, allowed recovery by a fourteen year
old girl for damages suffered while eating a can of salmon bought by her father. Green·
berg v. Lorenz (Dec. 13, 1957) in 138 N.Y L.J. No. 115, p. 9, col. 7. The appellate term
decision in this case is discussed at p. 1157 infra.
81 177 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct., Manhattan 1958).
82 Id. at 38.
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difficult to defend the court's assumption of the duty to correct the
mistakes of an appellate court. The need for stability in the law, as
well as the right of lawyers and litigants to know the status of their
rights, seems to demand, at least, that inferior courts follow established precedents. Although it is unquestionably true that courts "must
correct errors in the law and . . . must make . . . changes with the
times which are substantiated by reason and e."q>erience," 83 this is a
function of the Court of Appeals, not of the city courts.
The opinion itself is open to criticism. Although numerous arguments are made to show why the privity requirement should be discarded, and these are amply fortified with citations and e.~ensive
quotations, the heart of the privity question is never explored. The
effects of allowing a consumer who has been injured by a product to
bring a warranty action against anyone who took part in the manufacture or distribution of the goods are quickly by-passed. For instance, the court says that, "the only distinction [between a negligence
and a warranty action] is that the negligence action requires proof of
failure to use due care, whereas breach of warranty is liability (without negligence) for the fitness of the product." 8* For the litigant and
his attorney this is a tremendous distinction, completely changing the
burden of proof and imposing upon those engaged in putting the product on the market an entirely different duty. It would have been more
profitable if Justice Starke had spent less tin1e in arguing his position
and exerted more effort in investigating the significance of the change
which he advocates. He might also have considered whether the cases
involving foods and drugs present a different problem from those concerning other articles, a difference founded upon the community's
greater solicitude over products which they will ingest.
The final reported case in this area, Greenberg v. Lorenz,sr. was
the only one to reach an appellate court. The trial court had allowed
recovery by a fourteen year old girl for injuries suffered as a result of
eating the contents of a can of salmon purchased by her father, holding that the implied warranty of wholesomeness e.~tended to the girl
as a matter of law.86 The appellate term, with one justice dissenting,
affirmed.
Endorsing the view that the privity concept is anachronistic, the
majority explains its apparent failure to follow established precedents
requiring privity in breach of warranty actions by noting several
cases81 which, it is claimed, establish a new trend and render it clear
83
84

85
86

81

Id. at 37.
Id. at 20.
178 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Sup. Ct., App. T., 1st Dep't 1958).
178 N.Y.S.2d 404 (N.Y. City Ct., Bronx Co. 1957).
Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953);
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that when this question again reaches the higher appellate courts they
will overrule previous decisions. Once having discerned this trend, the
majority feels that it is "the right, nay the duty, of an intermediate
court, to take cognizance of it,"88 and to extend "the trend already
set in motion by superior authority." 89 There is no convincing support, however, from higher appellate courts showing such a trend.
None of the cases cited have indicated that the privity requirement is
to be abandoned. To the contrary, where recovery has been allowed
by a non-purchaser, the courts have specifically found privity to exist
by virtue of an agency relationship between the purchaser and the
injured plaintiff.90
The opinion is also interesting because of the novel interpretation
placed upon the legislature's failure to adopt proposed bills which
would abolish the privity requirement. It disposes of the contention
that the duty to reverse a long line of cases for what is essentially a
public policy reason lies more within the province of the legislature
than of the courts, and that the failure of the legislature to act might
indicate a desire to retain the requirement, with the following ratiocination:
Doubtlessly the Legislature has refrained from intruding amendatory legislation in the area we have been considering, because it has had
these considerations in mind-it believes that a change in a principle
originated by a judicial decision can safely be left to and effected by
decisional law to achieve the most salutary advance. 91

Not only is it more difficult to detect the legislature's reasons for
not acting than the court believes, but also the court begs the question by accepting 'as a premise the conclusion that this principle
originated by a judicial decision. A well reasoned dissent was written
by Justice Steuer. He would refuse recovery on the ground that a
breach of warranty action is based solely on the sale. Since sales are
specifically covered by statute, and the statute has been construed to
require a showing of privity between the parties in warranty actions,
there can be no recovery in such cases until the legislature amends the
law.
Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931); Bowman
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 284 App. Div. 663, 133 N.Y.S.2d 904 (4th Dcp't 1954),
aff'd, 308 N.Y. 780, 125 N.E.2d 165 (1955); Visusil v. W. T. Grant Co., 253 App. Div.
736, 300 N.Y. Supp. 652 (2d Dep't 1937).
88 178 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
80 Ibid.
90 Ryan v. Progressive Stores, Inc., 266 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931); Bowman
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 284 App. Div. 663, 133 N.Y.S.2d 904 (4th Dcp't 1954),
aff'd, 308 N.Y. 780, 125 N.E.2d 165 (1955).
91 140 N.Y.L.J. No. 73, at p. 2, col. 2.
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